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INVERSE CONDEMNATION UNAVAILABLE AS REMEDY FOR
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY VALUE BY CITY
ZONING ORDINANCE
Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426
(1980) (No. 79-602, 1979 Term)
The California Supreme Court inAgins v. Tiburon' established a ma-
jor zoning law precedent by disallowing inverse condemnation as a
remedy for an alleged deprivation of all value of a landowner's prop-
erty.
The city of Tiburon enacted a general land use plan designating ar-
eas of the city for open-space use.2 A zoning ordinance limited residen-
tial development of plaintiffs property to a density of .2 to I dwelling
units per acre.3 In his suit against the city, the landowner alleged that
the ordinance completely destroyed the value of his property.'
Plaintiff, for his first cause of action for inverse condemnation,
claimed damages for loss of value.' For his second cause of action,
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the ordinance as
violating the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution6 and
article I, section 19 of the California constitution' prohibiting uncom-
pensated taking. The superior court dismissed the case,' sustaining
1. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426
(1980) (No. 79-602, 1979 Term).
2. California state law requires every city to prepare a general land use plan. The plan
includes designating land for open-space, scenic beauty, housing, industry, business, and other
categories of private and public uses. "The land use element shall include a statement of the
standards of population density and building intensity recommended for the various districts and
other territory covered by the plan." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302(a) (Deering 1979).
3. Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance 124 N.S. (June 28, 1973), construedin Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal.
3d 266, -, 598 P.2d 25, 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 374 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426 (1980)
(No. 79-602, 1979 Term).
4. The court noted that following the enactment of Ordinance 124 N.S., Agins never sought
to use his property or to receive a definitive statement of how many dwelling units he could build.
24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
5. Id
6. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. art. V.
7. The California Constitution provides: "Private property may be taken or damaged for
public use only when just compensation, .. has first been paid to ... the owner..... CAL.
CONsT. art. I, § 19.
8. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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defendant's general demurrer to the inverse condemnation claim with-
out leave to amend, 9 and sustaining the demurrer to the declaratory
judgment claim with ten days' leave to amend.' 0 On appeal the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed and held- A landowner alleging that a
zoning ordinance deprived him of all reasonable and substantial use of
the land may not claim inverse condemnation as a remedy" and in-
stead must rely on declaratory relief or mandamus.' 2
Eminent domain is the sovereign's power to confiscate or use private
property without the owner's consent. 13 The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution,' 4 applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment,' 5 prohibits the taking of property for public use
without compensation. This constitutional provision is the basis for the
government's power to condemn property and for citizens' right to
compensation. The compensation requirement ensures distribution of
costs throughout the community.' 6 The California constitution simi-
larly prohibits governmental taking of property, and requires compen-
sation for damage to property. 17
In contrast to the mandatory compensation requirement of eminent
domain, police power regulation does not require compensation.,8 Po-
9. Courts should not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if a possibility exists that
the defect is curable, unless it is clear that no cause of action exists for the alleged act. "Leave to
amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiffs claim
is clear, but, under the substantive law, no liability exists. Obviously,no amendment would
change the result." 3 WITKINS CIV. PRO. § 847 (2d ed. 1971).
10. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
11. Id
12. The court in the second part of the opinion denied declaratory relief to Agins on the
theory that plaintiff retained reasonable or substantial use. Id at -, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr.
at 378.
13. 1 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11, at 2 (revd. 3d ed. Rohan
comp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]; see Comment, Regulation of Land Use." From Magna
Carla to a Just Formulation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 904, 904 n.4 (1976).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
16. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943); Cormack, Legal
Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 224 (1941). See also Eldridge v. City of
Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 626, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 582 (1976) (purpose behind inverse as well
as ordinary condemnation).
17. See note 7 supra; note 66 infra.
18. Eminent domain takes property because it is useful to the public, while the police
power regulates the use of, or impairs rights in, property to prevent detriment to public
interest; in the exercise of eminent domain private property is taken for public use and
the owner is compensated, while the police power regulates an owner's use and enjoy-
ment of property, or deprives him of it by destruction, for the public welfare, without
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VIDEO-TAPED DEPOSITIONS
In United States P. Benfield4 7 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
asserted that both physical confrontation and concurrent cross-exami-
nation are essential elements of a defendant's sixth amendment right of
confrontation a.4  Unless the defendant waives, forfeits, or loses by ne-
cessity this constitutional right, a confrontation that does not entail an
actual face-to-face meeting between the accused and the witness does
not meet the requirements of the sixth amendment.49 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court specifically relied upon Mattox v. United
States,5" Kirby v. United States,5 Dowdell v. United States,5" and Sny-
der %. Massachusetts.53 Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Judge
Gibson argued that, "While some recent cases use other language, none
denies that confrontation required a face-to-face meeting in 1791 and
none lessens the force of the sixth amendment."54
In the opinion of the court, physical confrontation is of primary im-
portance because it guarantees to the accused the right to participate in
the conduct of his defense.5 Moreover, the court expressed the belief
that the accuracy of an adverse witness' testimony is sharpened by the
presence of the defendant.5 6 Cross-examination is an essential com-
Eraluation anda LegalAnal)sis, 26 STAN. L. REV. 619 (1974); 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 924 (1971); 42
Mo. L. REV. 121 (1977).
See also G. CHU & W. SCHRAMM, LEARNING FROM TELEVISION 84-86 (1968) (study indicated
that media instruction to students matches effectiveness of live instruction); Ryan & Cassan, Tele-
rision E;idence in Court, 122 AM. J. PSYCH. 655 (1965) (discussing use of video-taped interviews to
determine legal competency).
47. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
48. Id at 821.
49, Id at 820-22.
50, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
51, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
52. 221 U.S. 325 (1911). See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
53, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
54. 593 F.2d at 821.
55, Id.
56. Id.
The right of cross-examination reinforces the importance of physical confrontation.
Most believe that in some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and communica-
tion are influenced by face-to-face challenge. This feature is a part of the sixth amend-
ment right additional to the right of cold, logical cross-examination by one's counsel.
Id
In a footnote, the court noted that -[e]xclusion of the defendant from a deposition where testi-
mony is taken for introduction at trial also potentially conflicts with the defendant's right of self-
representation." Id at 821 n.8 (citations omitted).
The court cited no authority to support its contention that a face-to-face meeting between de-
fendant and witness increases the likelihood that the witness will truthfully relate the facts.
Whether effective cross-examination by counsel produces the same result, and whether the court's
Number 41 1117
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panion to physical confrontation, but it is not independently sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of the sixth amendment. 7
Once the court established that physical confrontation was required,
it turned to the question of whether Benfield, verbally or through his
actions, had lost the protection of his constitutional right. The court
found that Benfield had not waived, forfeited, or lost by necessity his
right to physically confront Cady at the deposition.5 8 No evidence of
an affirmative waiver by Benfield existed,5 9 and the court did not find
the charge against Benfield so heinous as to excuse the prosecutrix from
facing defendant while testifying.60 Shifting its focus to the specific
procedure used at the deposition, the court found that the absence of a
face-to-face meeting between Benfield and Cady, and the latter's un-
awareness that during the course of the deposition she was being moni-
tored by defendant, resulted in only an imperfect confrontation.6 As
such, it was insufficient to test the accuracy of Cady's perceptions and
expressions of her ordeal.62
The court carefully noted that it did not condemn the use of elec-
tronic devices in the courtroom. 63  Instead, the court's concern
stemmed from the particular procedure employed. The deposition pro-
cedure used was "ft]oo great an abridgement. . . of defendant's con-
proposition is sound from a psychological standpoint is unclear. See generally C. KLEINKE, FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 27 (1975); M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 166-73
(1972); Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239
(1967); 44 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 517, 521-25 (1976); see also United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131,
1141 (4th Cir. 1978) (Widener, J., dissenting) (undocumented statement that "we must recognize
that a witness will often make accusations behind the back of the accused which he will not repeat
to his face").
57. 593 F.2d at 821. "The right of cross-examination reinforces the importance of physical
confrontation." Id.
58. Id at 821-22.
59. Id at 821.
60. Id The court merely assumed, without deciding, that a grievous crime against a person
could excuse the victim from facing the defendant while testifying. Id Although noting that State
v. Richey, 107 Ariz. 552, 555, 490 P.2d 558, 561 (1971), allowed the examination, in defendant's
absence, of a child abuse victim's competency to testify, the Benfleld court found no indication
that the child had given substantive testimony in the defendant's absence. 593 F.2d at 821 n.10.
The Benfield court concluded that "[tlo find a waiver or forfeiture in this case would destroy the
right of confrontation in nearly all cases of alleged crimes against persons." Id at 821.
61. 593 F.2d at 821-22.
62. Id
63. "Today's decision should not be regarded as prohibiting the development of electronic
video technology in litigation. Where the parties agree to a given procedure or where the proce-
dure more nearly approximates the traditional courtroom setting, our approval might be forth-
coming." Id. at 821.
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VIDEO-TAPED DEPOSITIONS
frontation right to pass constitutional muster."'  The court ordered
that Benfield's conviction be reversed65 and, after disposing of Ben-
field's objections against the government's ability to retry him,6 6 re-
manded the case to the district court for further proceedings.67
Benfield's significance lies in the Eighth Circuit's reestablishment of
the requirement of a face-to-face meeting between defendants and wit-
nesses as an important part of the constitutional right of confrontation.
The court's emphasis on defendants' right to personal, physical con-
frontation is consistent with the Mattox line of cases68 and the holdings
of Diaz and Allen.69 The Supreme Court's recent focus on effective
cross-examination as the essential element of confrontation, however,
had shifted the requirement of physical confrontation to the back-
ground.7" Thus, the Benfield court's reemphasis on face-to-face meet-
ings absent a showing of waiver, forfeiture, or necessity indicates that
physical confrontation has not been eliminated from the rights guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment.
The decision in Benfield is also important because the court expressly
approved the use in criminal trials of video-taped depositions that com-
ply with the terms of Rule 15 and allow the defendant to participate
actively in the proceeding. Commentators generally agree that a jury is
capable of satisfactorily viewing a deponent's demeanor through video
tape,7 and the court's decision exhibits a willingness to accept this
proposition.72
A deposition proceeding plays a significant role in the ultimate deter-
64. Id "Here the right of confrontation was considerably curtailed by the procedures em-
ployed. What curtailment or diminishment might be constitutionally permissible depends on the
factual context of each case, including the defendant's conduct." Id
65. Id at 822.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See notes 18, 21 supra and accompanying text.
69. In neither Diaz nor Allen did the Supreme Court declare defendant's confrontation right
satisfied by vicarious representation through counsel. Instead, the Court devised the waiver and
forfeiture exceptions, respectively, to the right of confrontation. See notes 30-37 supra and accom-
panying text. Thus, the ability of Benfield's attorney to cross-examine Cady at the deposition, see
note II supra, could not properly support a finding that Benfield's right of confrontation was
satisfied.
70. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
71. See cases and other authorities cited note 46 supra.
72. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 25, at 115 (when applied to Benfield, sug-
gests that although video tape sufficiently exhibits a witness' demeanor, the Constitution may not
require that the jury view demeanor).
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mination of a defendant's guilt or innocence. Thus, the Ben field court's
careful scrutiny of the procedure employed during the victim's deposi-
tion is commendable. The court's holding that confrontation between
defendants and witnesses must be complete precludes a step backward
toward a judicial system in which ex parte affidavits and depositions
would be sufficient to support a criminal conviction.73
73. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); note 28 supra.
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INVERSE CONDEMNATION UNAVAILABLE AS REMEDY FOR
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY VALUE BY CITY
ZONING ORDINANCE
Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426
(1980) (No. 79-602, 1979 Term)
The California Supreme Court in Agins v. Tiburon I established a ma-
jor zoning law precedent by disallowing inverse condemnation as a
remedy for an alleged deprivation of all value of a landowner's prop-
erty.
The city of Tiburon enacted a general land use plan designating ar-
eas of the city for open-space use.' A zoning ordinance limited residen-
tial development of plaintiffs property to a density of .2 to 1 dwelling
units per acre.3 In his suit against the city, the landowner alleged that
the ordinance completely destroyed the value of his property.4
Plaintiff, for his first cause of action for inverse condemnation,
claimed damages for loss of value.5 For his second cause of action,
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the ordinance as
violating the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution6 and
article I, section 19 of the California constitution7 prohibiting uncom-
pensated taking. The superior court dismissed the case,' sustaining
1. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426
(1980) (No. 79-602, 1979 Term).
2. California state law requires every city to prepare a general land use plan. The plan
includes designating land for open-space, scenic beauty, housing, industry, business, and other
categories of private and public uses. "The land use element shall include a statement of the
standards of population density and building intensity recommended for the various districts and
other territory covered by the plan." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(a) (Deering 1979).
3. Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance 124 N.S. (June 28, 1973), construedin Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal.
3d 266, -, 598 P.2d 25, 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 374 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426 (1980)
(No. 79-602, 1979 Term).
4. The court noted that following the enactment of Ordinance 124 N.S., Agins never sought
to use his property or to receive a definitive statement of how many dwelling units he could build.
24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
5. id
6. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
7. The California Constitution provides: "Private property may be taken or damaged for
public use only when just compensation, .. has first been paid to ... the owner... CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 19.
8. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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defendant's general demurrer to the inverse condemnation claim with-
out leave to amend, 9 and sustaining the demurrer to the declaratory
judgment claim with ten days' leave to amend.' 0 On appeal the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed and held- A landowner alleging that a
zoning ordinance deprived him of all reasonable and substantial use of
the land may not claim inverse condemnation as a remedy" and in-
stead must rely on declaratory relief or mandamus.' 2
Eminent domain is the sovereign's power to confiscate or use private
property without the owner's consent. 3 The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution, 4 applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment,' 5 prohibits the taking of property for public use
without compensation. This constitutional provision is the basis for the
government's power to condemn property and for citizens' right to
compensation. The compensation requirement ensures distribution of
costs throughout the community. 6 The California constitution simi-
larly prohibits governmental taking of property, and requires compen-
sation for damage to property."
In contrast to the mandatory compensation requirement of eminent
domain, police power regulation does not require compensation.' 8 Po-
9. Courts should not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if a possibility exists that
the defect is curable, unless it is clear that no cause of action exists for the alleged act. "Leave to
amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiffs claim
is clear, but, under the substantive law, no liability exists. Obviously,no amendment would
change the result." 3 WITKINS CIV. PRO. § 847 (2d ed. 1971).
10. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
11. Id
12. The court in the second part of the opinion denied declaratory relief to Agins on the
theory that plaintiff retained reasonable or substantial use. Id at -, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal, Rptr.
at 378.
13. 1 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11, at 2 (revd. 3d ed. Rohan
comp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]; see Comment, Regulation ofLand Use: From Magna
Carta to a Just Formulation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 904, 904 n.4 (1976).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
16. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943); Cormack, Legal
Concepts in Cases fEminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 224 (1941). See also Eldridge v. City of
Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 626, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 582 (1976) (purpose behind inverse as well
as ordinary condemnation).
17. See note 7 supra; note 66 infra.
18. Eminent domain takes property because it is useful to the public, while the police
power regulates the use of, or impairs rights in, property to prevent detriment to public
interest; in the exercise of eminent domain private property is taken for public use and
the owner is compensated, while the police power regulates an owner's use and enjoy-
ment of property, or deprives him of it by destruction, for the public welfare, without
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/9
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lice power regulation must serve the interests of public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare.' 9 Historically, courts have expanded the
scope of police power and ,consequently, have restricted property
rights.2 1 Police power banished nuisances in the 1800's2t and now en-
compensation other than the sharing of the resulting general benefits. Constitutional
provisions against taking private property for public use without just compensation im-
pose no barrier to the proper exercise of the police power.
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1965). See also Hulen v. City of Corsicana, 65 F.2d 969, 970 (5th
Cir. 1933); Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404, 410 (W.D. Pa. 1958), rev'don other grounds sub
nom. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959): Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. United States, 128 F.
Supp. 408, 413 (Ct. CL. 1955); House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384,
391, 153 P.2d 950, 953 (1944); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 408, 348 P.2d 664,
668-69 (1960); Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 36, 198 P. 377, 380 (1921); 1 NICHOLS,
supra note 13, at § 1.42(1); J. SACKMAN, THE IMPACT OF ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN UPON
EACH OTHER 107 (1971).
19. Village of Belle Terrev. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1973); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D.
Cal. 1974); Brown v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 385 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D. Nev. 1973);
McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 885, 264 P.2d 932, 935 (1953); Wilkins v.
City of San Bernadino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 338, 175 P.2d 542, 547 (1946); Gisler v. County of Madera,
38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 306, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919, 920 (1974); Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 314, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95 (1972); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.42; Bowden, Legal
Battles on the California Coast: J Review of the Rules, 2 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 273,
275 (19761; Comment, "Takings" Under The Police Power-The Development of Inverse Condem-
nation as a Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 30 Sw. L.J. 723, 725 (1976). See generally
Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Powver, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098 (1959).
20. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926); Miller v. Board
Of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484-85, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925). See notes 21-22 infra.
21. See Standard Oil v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929) (ordinance proscribed burial
of petroleum tanks); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 324 (1927) (zoning ordinance classi-
fied building); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (ordinance restricted
industrial development); Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916) (ordinance
prohibited emission of dense smoke) Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ordinance
prohibited operation of brick foundry): Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (ordinance
prohibited operation of livery stable), Heerdt v. City of Portland, 8 F.2d 871 (D. Or. 1925) (ordi-
nance prohibited maintenance of fuel yards); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P.
381 (1925) (ordinance restricted area to two-family dwelling units).
In short, the police power, as such, is not confined within the narrow circumscription of
precedents, resting upon past conditions which do not cover and control present day
conditions obviously calling for revised regulations to promote the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare of the public . ,. What was at one time regarded as an im-
proper exercise of the police power may now . . . be recognized as a legitimate exercise
of that power.
Id at 484, 234 P. at 383. See also Comment. supra note 13, at 907. A regulation that extends
beyond prevention of a noxious use is invalid. Willison v. Cook, 54 Colo. 320, 130 P. 828 (1913)
(building of store could not be restricted under police power when use did not infringe on rights of
others); City of St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 22 S.W. 861 (1893) (building restrictions unconstitu-
tional).
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compasses zoning to protect open-space land.22
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving a regulation to be arbitrary or
unreasonable.23 Courts use two approaches to define this standard in
zoning cases. First, the goal of the regulation must be in the public
welfare.24 The most effective way to attack a regulation's objective is to
argue bad-faith government action.25 Specifically, courts will grant re-
lief to a landowner who proves that a regulation was enacted to lower
property values in anticipation of condemnation.26 The second cate-
gory determines the validity of a regulation by measuring its effect on
landowners. 27  The property affected by the regulation must retain
some use, although it may not be the most beneficial use,28 and the land
22. Brown v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 385 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Nev. 1973) (general
forest and recreation); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365 (1975) (open space), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal.
App. 3d 667, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1978) (private commercial, recreational); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957
(1978); Pinhiero v. County of Marin, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (open space);
Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976) (same),
23. Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 395 (1926); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma,
522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 677, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 687, 694 (1978); see Feiler, Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. URB. L. 319, 321-22
(1969). See also Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging By Police Power. The Searchfor Inverse Con-
demnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1971).
24. See Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 14-26. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954).
25. Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 23-26. See generally Sax, Taking and The Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 60-64 (1964).
26. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated,
417 F. Supp. 1125 (1976) (landowners, led to believe acquisitions inevitable, prevented from de-
veloping land); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (moratoriums that
preceded zoning intended to decrease value of land in event of acquisition); Willey v. Griggs, 89
Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960) (development prohibited to decrease cost of acquiring highway);
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) (condemnor
unreasonable in issuing precondemnation announcements); Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 88 Cal.
App. 3d 654, 671-76, 151 Cal. Rptr. 912, 921-23 (1979) (totality of city's activity found unreasona-
ble); Peacock v. City of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 853, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391, 397 (1969)
(county restricted development, intending to prevent cost increase from date ordinance enacted to
date of acquisition); Long v. City of Highland Park, 329 Mich. 146, 45 N.W.2d 10 (1950) (zoned
commercial area residential to reduce cost of acquisition). See also City of Walnut Creek v. Lead-
ership Hous. Sys., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 619-20, 140 Cal. Rptr. 690, 694 (1977); Van Alstyne,
supra note 23, at 23.
27. See Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 27-48. See generally Sax, supra note 25; Comment,
supra note 13.
28. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (prohibition of most beneficial
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/9
Number 4] INVERSE CONDEMNATION 1125
must retain some value,29 although the value may be severely dimin-
ished.3" Courts grant relief to landowners deprived of substantially all
use.3 A temporary regulation is valid on the assumption that the land-
owner will regain use of the property in the future.32 Furthermore, the
regulation must prevent a harm to the public rather than confer a bene-
fit.3 3 Landowners subject to easements and rights of access have shown
unconstitutional government action because the government benefited
use is not per se evidence of unconstitutionality). See also Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City
of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962); Brown v. City of Fremont, 75 Cal. App. 3d 141, 147, 142 Cal. Rptr. 46, 50 (1977); Turner v.
County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972); Smith v. County of Santa
Barbara, 243 Cal. App. 2d 126, 129, 52 Cal. Rptr. 292, 295 (1966).
29. Justice Holmes stated the rule in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922): "[Wlhile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking." The ordinance was invalidated because it was an unconstitutional use
of police power.
30. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975)
!80% diminution in market value does not invalidate regulation or require award of damages),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 146 Cal. Rptr.
687 (1978) (diminution in market value insufficient to show taking); Orsetti v. City of Fremont, 80
Cal. App. 3d 961, 146 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1978) (same); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776 (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1978); Pinheiro
v. County of Main, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 329, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (1976) (diminution in value
absent allegation of precondemnation activities, lack of beneficial use, or public use of property,
insufficient to show taking).
31. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 80 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 146 Cal. Rptr.
103 (1978) (court found ordinance valid but granted compensation because landowner denied all
substantial use); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976)
(same); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J.
539, 549, 193 A.2d 232, 242 (1963) (ordinance, restricting use of swampland deprived landowner
of all reasonable use, unconstitutional); Summers v. City of Glen Cove, 17 N.Y.2d 307, 308, 217
N.E 2d 663, 664, 270 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (1966) (ordinance limiting use of land to one single-family
dwelling was so economically infeasible on particular lot as to amount to confiscation); Arverne
Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 226-27, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591-92 (1938) (ordinance per-
manently depriving owner of all profitable or reasonable use of land is unconstitutional). See also
Pinheiro v. County of Marin, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 326-27, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (1976) (dictum).
32. United States v. Central Eureka Mining, 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1957) (temporary restriction
on operation of gold mines in aid of war effort not unconstitutional taking); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v.
Town of Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956, 962 (1st Cir. 1972) (adoption of ordinance as stopgap measure
in emergency not unconstitutional); State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 253, 524 P.2d 1281,
1291, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497, 507 (1974) (denial of permit to develop land during environmental study
not unconstitutional). See also Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972); Comment, supra note 13, at 922.
33. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (regulation to eliminate noxious use); see note 21
-upra. See also Dunham, .4 Legal and Economic Basis For City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650
(1958); Comment, supra note 13, at 907-I1.
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from the regulation. 4 Finally, the public benefit from the regulation
must outweigh the private loss. 35 If the diminution in value is greater
than the public benefit accomplished by the regulation, the government
has exceeded its police power.36
Upon finding a regulation arbitrary or unreasonable, the court may
award the landowner declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus declar-
ing the law unconstitutional as applied to the land in question,3 7 or
may award damages for inverse condemnation.38
Inverse condemnation is a private cause of action to force the gov-
ernment to initiate condemnation under eminent domain.3 9 Generally,
courts allow inverse condemnation only when government action
causes irreparable harm-when declaratory relief would not restore the
landowner to his original position.40 These cases fall into three catego-
ries. First, courts compensate landowners whose property is damaged
as a result of public improvements made to adjacent land.4' Second,
34. Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (right of access); Bacich v. Board
of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) (same); Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App.
3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974) (air easement), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Sneed v.
County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963) (same).
35. City of Houston v. Johnny Frank's Auto Parts Co., 480 S.W.2d 774, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972) (quoting Caruthers v. Board of Adjustment, 290 S.W.2d 340, 346 (1956)); Comment, supra
note 19, at 727-28; Comment, supra note 13, at 911-14.
36. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382
P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963); Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 29 (1938). See also
Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 35-42.
37. Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963) (ordinance
declared invalid as applied to particular property owner); Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83
P.2d 29 (1938) (ordinance creating an island is arbitrary and discriminatory); Pacific Palisades
Ass'n v. City of Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 P. 538 (1925) (ordinance declared an arbi-
trary interference); Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958)
(ordinance found arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory); Dooley v. Town Planning & Zon-
ing Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (zoning charge unreasonable and confiscatory).
38. For a general discussion on inverse condemnation see Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on
the Integration ofPolice Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts. So-Called Inverse or Reverse
Condemnation, 1968 URB. L. ANN. 1; Van Alstyne, supra note 23; Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its
Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439 (1974);
Comment, supra note 19; 13 URB. L. ANN. 263 (1977).
39. See notes 7, 38 supra. See also Feder & Wieland, Inverse Condemnation-A Viable Alter-
native, 51 DEN. L.J. 529, 530 (1974).
40. See Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law?,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1584-89 (1977); Note, supra note 38, at 1444-49. But see Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (although case resolved on
immunity issue, court in dictum indicated inverse condemnation is appropriate in restrictive zon-
ing cases).
41. Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 475 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970) (construe-
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courts compensate for nonregulatory activities that cause the govern-
ment to acquire an easement or right of access to effectuate a public
improvement.42 Third, inverse condemnation is appropriate in cases in
which government regulation has unreasonably delayed condemnation
or has lowered market value before condemnation.43
In most downzoning actions courts do not award damages in inverse
condemnation because the regulation does not involve physical inva-
sion. The regulation usually restricts the owner's use of his property
but does not constitute a compensable taking under the Constitution.'
Courts disallow inverse condemnation in regulatory cases involving
mere diminution in market value45 or future implementation of the
regulation.46
tion of subway caused property damage); Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398
P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965) (highway improvement caused landslide that damaged adjacent
property); House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 (1944)
(negligent replacement of dikes caused storm river to break levees damaging private property).
See also Note, supra note 38, at 1443.
42. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
43. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 40.
44. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cer.
denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514
P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); Viso v. State, 92 Cal. App. 3d 15, 154 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1979);
Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1978); City of Walnut Creek
v. Leadership Hous. Sys., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 140 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1977); see note 22 supra
and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 38, at 1443-53.
45. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975)
(80% diminution in value not enough to show taking), cer. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Viso v.
State, 92 Cal. App. 3d 15, 21, 154 Cal. Rptr. 580, 585 (1979) (plaintiffs failed to allege that no
reasonably beneficial ue remained); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 687 (1978) (plaintiffs alleged only diminution in value); Orsetti v. City of Fremont, 80 Cal.
App. 3d 961, 970, 146 Cal. Rptr. 75, 80 (1978) (reduction in market value does not state a cause of
action for inverse condemnation); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 79 Cal.
App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776 (diminution in value not enough to show taking), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 957 (1978); Pinheiro v. County of Marin, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 326, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634
(1976) (plaintiffs alleged reduction in market value); Smith v. County of Santa Barbara, 243 Cal.
App. 2d 126, 128, 52 Cal. Rptr. 292, 295 (1966) (plaintiffs alleged land worthless for highest and
best economic use); MacGibbon v. Board of App., 369 Mass. 512, 517, 340 N.E.2d 487, 490 (1976)
(diminution in value not enough to show taking).
46. State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 256, 524 P.2d 1281, 1292, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497, 509
(1974) (temporary denial of permit because development may conflict with proposed plan is not at
this time a taking); Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119, 514 P.2d
1i, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1973) (tentative plan did not amount to intention to condemn);
Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 108, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (1976) (future
plan cannot be challenged until implemented); Hilltop Properties v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349,
356, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (1965) (planning in anticipation of public improvement is noncompen-
sable).
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In Eldridge v. City of Palo A4lto 4 7 the California court of appeals ex-
panded the remedy of inverse condemnation to include a regulation's
destruction of all substantial use of the property.48 The Palo Alto ordi-
nance required a ten-acre minimum lot size.49 The court concluded
that the ordinance was so restrictive as to constitute a taking, thus justi-
fying a claim for damages in inverse condemnation.5
In Agins the California Supreme Court stated that Agins was not
entitled to relief in inverse condemnation or to declaratory relief.5'
Considering on demurrer 2 the availability of inverse condemnation as
a remedy when affected property retains no value,53 the court offered
two lines of reasoning to overrule Eldridge.5 4  First, the court con-
cluded that an ordinance alleged to deprive the landowner of all use of
his property was necessarily arbitrary and unreasonable55 and an inva-
lid exercise of police power. The court did not transmute the unconsti-
tutional regulation into a valid exercise of eminent domain because the
ordinance contained no provision for compensation. 6
Second, the court focused on the potential impact of inverse condem-
nation on planning policy, examining three areas of adverse conse-
47. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
48. Id at 634, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
49. The court noted that the one and five acre zones appeared to meet the requirement that
the owner be allowed reasonable use of his property. Id. at 624, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
50. Id.
51. 24 Cal. 3d 266 at -, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
52. When ruling on a demurrer the court must accept the facts properly pleaded by the plain-
tiff as true. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 512, 542 P.2d 237, 239, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365, 367 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura,
10 Cal. 3d 110, 124, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 807 (1973); Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App.
3d 101, 106, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (1976). But see rules on judicial notice in Saltares v. Kris-
rovich, 6 Cal. App. 3d 504, 511, 85 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (1970); CAL. EVID. CODE § 452 (Deering
1979); note 76 infra. See also Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 127 Cal.
Rptr. at 522, Covig v. RKO General, Inc., 232 Cal. App. 2d 56, 63-64, 42 Cal. Rptr. 473, 478
(1965).
53. The Supreme Court in HFH had left undecided the question of whether inverse condem-
nation is available in cases in which the landowner is deprived of substantially all use of his
property. See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 520 n.16, 542 P.2d 237, 244 n.16, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365, 372 n.16 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
54. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
55. Id (quoting NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 142(l)); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6, at 182
(1965). See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 80 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 103, 114 (1978) (discussion of remedy when police power is arbitrary).
56. 24 Cal. 3d at--, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (citing I NICHOLS, supra note 13, at
§ 142(1)).
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quence5 7 The majority argued that government liability would deter
cities from passing innovative land use regulations.-8 That would re-
sult in judicial control over public expenditures because the legislature
would be reluctant to act for fear of unpredictable financial conse-
quences 9 The second policy reason against inverse condemnation is
that the court in issuing compensation would usurp the legislative func-
tion.60 In addition, voters would have the power to commit funds from
the treasury to compensate a landowner affected by restrictive zoning.
This result is a logical extension of the California voters' present ability
to exercise zoning control by initiative. 6' For these reasons the major-
ity concluded that declaratory relief or mandamus was the proper rem-
edy.6
2
Having settled the issue of inverse condemnation, the court ad-
dressed Agins' right to declaratory relief.63 The court concluded that
on the face of the ordinance 64 Agins fell within the holding of HFN,
Ltd v. Superior Court-that mere diminution in market value is insuf-
ficient to establish the invalidity of a regulation.65
In dissent, Justice Clark presented several arguments to support re-
tention of inverse condemnation as a remedy in zoning disputes. First,
he posited that the California State Constitution guarantees just com-
pensation when the government takes or damages private property for
public use.66  Because the ordinance destroyed the value of Agins'
property, and because Tiburon derived benefits from this action, Agins
57. Id. at-, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
58. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (citing Note, supra note 40, at 1597). See
also Brief for Amici Curiae City of Tiburon at 20.
59. See note 58 supra.
60. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
61. Id at -, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
62. Id at -, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
63. Id
64. The court took judicial notice of the Tiburon ordinance. The ordinance allowed Agins
development of .2 to 1 dwelling units per acre. On the face of this ordinance, Agins' property
clearly maintained some value, though perhaps a diminished value. See note 12 supra; note 74
inra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 30, 45 supra and accompanying text.
66. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (Clark, J., dissenting). Other courts
have interpreted the word "damage" in the California Constitution. See generally HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 524, 542 P.2d 237, 248, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 376 (1975) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) ("There is no reason why this word should be construed in any other than its ordinary
sense. It embraces more than taking."), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Bacich v. Board of
Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) (word "damages" indicates liberal policy of compen-
sation).
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could seek compensation. Second, the dissent argued that legislation
sanctioning open-space zoning expressly prohibited damaging of prop-
erty without compensation.67 Consistent precedent supported the rule
that harsh zoning gives rise to inverse condemnation; the majority ig-
nored that precedent.68 Third, the dissent claimed the ruling concern-
ing inverse condemnation was obiter dicta because the majority
ultimately found that Agins fell within the HFH ruling of mere dimi-
nution.69 Fourth, the dissent asserted that the Supreme Court ulti-
mately would overrule Agins. Federal constitutional guarantees are at
stake, and federal decisions in similar cases support inverse condemna-
tion as a remedy.70 Last, the dissent warned of the adverse effects that
could occur as a result of the court's decision.7' A landowner who may
sue only for invalidation and not compensation will lose interim use of
his land and be subjected to costly legal proceedings. Even if the land-
owner does prevail, the government can reenact a modified regula-
tion.72
In considering the cause of action for inverse condemnation the
Agins court ruled out the availability of inverse condemnation when
property is deprived of all value.73 In the second cause of action for
declaratory relief, the court took judicial notice of the ordinance and
concluded that Agins' property retained some value.74 Thus, the case
became one of "mere diminution" decided within the holding of
HFH.75 The court should have applied the logic of the second argu-
67. The government code provides:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that this article is not intended and shall not be
construed, as authorizing the city or county to exercise or adopt, amend or appeal an
open-space zoning ordinance in a manner which will take or damage property for public
use without the payment of just compensation therefor. This section is not intended to
increase or decrease the rights of any owner of property under the Constitution of the
State of California or of the United States.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65912 (Deering 1979).
68. The dissent cited Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1972) (in bank). See notes 26, 43 supra and accompanying text. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at
33, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 380 (Clark, J., dissenting).
69. 24 Cal. 3d at-, 598 P.2d at 34 n.3, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 381 n.3. See notes 63-64 supra and
accompanying text.
70. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 34-35, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 381-82. See note 40 supra.
71. 24 Cal. 3d at-, 598 P.2d at 35, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
72. Id See also Appellant's Petition For Rehearing at 21-26.
73. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 28-29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375-76.
74. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
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ment to the inverse condemnation claim.76 The HFH diminution-in-
value holding fails to give rise to Agins' cause of action in inverse con-
demnation.77 Judge Clark asserted persuasively that the ruling on in-
verse condemnation is dictum.7" Nevertheless, the California Supreme
Court's position on inverse condemnation is apparent: inverse con-
demnation is not a valid cause of action when a landowner alleges total
destruction of property value as a result of zoning.7 9
The court's decision does not deviate from precedent and supports
sound policy considerations.80 Agins is a case of first impression. 8 Al-
though HFH decided only the issue of inverse condemnation regarding
diminution82 and left open the question of total deprivation of value, 3
HFH in no way mandated the conclusion that deprivation of all value
would lead to a contrary decision. Courts have granted inverse con-
demnation only when invalidation would fail to restore the landowner
to his original position. 4 Deprivation of all value because of a restric-
tive ordinance does not fall into this "irreversible" category. Agins
does not stand for the proposition that inverse condemnation is not
available when the state takes an easement 6 or when the regulation
reduces market value prior to condemnation. 7 Agins addressed only
76. The court should have taken judicial notice of the ordinance when it ruled on the inverse
condemnation claim. Plaintiff alleged that his property retained no value. Plaintiff's allegation
should not have deterred the court from examining the ordinance and giving it primacy over the
allegation in the complaint as the court did when it decided the declaratory judgment issue. The
Tiburon ordinance allowed Agins' development of .2 to 1 dwelling units per acre. Under this
ordinance Agins' property clearly maintains some value, although perhaps a diminished value.
"A demurrer reaches not only the pleading itself, but also such matters as may be considered
under the doctrine of judicial notice. The complaint is to be read as if it contains all judicial
matters of which the court can take judicial notice even in theface of allegations to the contrary."
Saltares v. Kristovich, 6 Cal. App. 3d 504, 511, 85 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (1970) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). See also Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 105, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 520, 522 (1976); CAL. EVID. CODE § 452 (Deering 1979).
77. See notes 45, 65 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note I I supra and accompanying text.
80. See Note, supra note 38, at 1446-53.
81. No other California Supreme Court case has decided the issue of inverse condemnation
when the landowner alleges deprivation of all value. The California Court of Appeals addressed
the issue. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
82. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 52 supra.
84. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
87. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. Contra, note 68 supra and accompanying text.
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the unavailability of inverse condemnation when declaratory judgment
and mandamus will restore the landowner to his original position. 8
The court's rejection of inverse condemnation on the ground that
landowners should not be given their choice of relief is based on two
sound policy considerations.89 Legislators would otherwise be less
likely to deal innovatively with the environmental effects of rapidly
growing communities for fear of financial liability. If every landowner
were compensated for loss of use the legislature would have less control
over the allocation of public expenditures. 9° In addition, the function
of the legislature is to weigh the costs and benefits of a policy-a func-
tion the courts cannot perform. The legislature can balance the public
benefits against the cost of compensation under eminent domain and
determine the better solution.9'
The California Supreme Court overreached its proper concern in
Agins v. Tiburon by addressing the availability of inverse condemna-
tion when property retains no value.92 The court's intention is never-
theless clear: declaratory relief and mandamus are the only
appropriate remedies available to landowners affected by severe
downzoning.93
88. The majority distinguished Kopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) (in bank), from Agins. "Klopping involved a plaintiff's recovery for the decline
in market value as the result of an unreasonable delay in the institution of eminent domain pro-
ceedings following announcement of intent to condemn. . . . In the matter before us there was
no such delay or conduct." The majority did not overrule Klopping. Inverse condemnation is still
appropriate in a case where there is irreparable harm. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 378.
89. See note 57-61 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 38, at 1450. But
see HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 523, 542 P.2d 237, 248, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 376
(1975) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Appellants' Petition for Rehearing
at 17-26, 39.
90. See note 59 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 40, at 1597; Note,
supra note 38, at 1450.
91. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. See also note 89 supra.
92. See note 78 supra.
93. 24 Cal. 3d at -, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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